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Abstract
Korea’s traditional growth model has reached an apparent lim-
it. The main reason is because of the ineffectiveness in at least 
one of the three growth drivers: (1) trade surplus from export-
ing goods (macro-economy level), (2) manufacturing industry 
(industry level) and (3) large conglomerates (corporate level). 
The three drivers intersect into a single factor—Samsung Elec-
tronics (Samsung). This paper first answers the question as to 
whether the Korean economy depends too much on Samsung by 
setting forth a new classification and characterizing Samsung as 
a “systemically important corporation (SICO).” This paper shows 
that Samsung is a “systemically important corporation (SICO)” 
in terms of size, interconnectedness, and business complex-
ity. If Samsung qualifies as a SICO, to reduce the systemic risk 
of Korean economy, Samsung should be viewed, treated and 
regulated accordingly. Two policy issues are emphasized: (1) an-
ti-monopoly and fair trade, and (2) separation of financial busi-
ness from manufacturing business. This paper also shows that 
Samsung’s success is closely associated with the unique nature 
of semiconductor technology: constant but gradual changes. In 
other words, in the semiconductor industry, a similar innovative 
pattern repeats itself without an unexpected jump. Because of 
the resonance of this technology with the Korean people, culture 
and corporate structure, this paper suggests that Korea should 
search for industries which have a pattern of technology resem-
bling the semiconductor industry (e.g. biosimilar industry) as 
sectors for future growth.
Key words: Korea’s economy, chaebols, Samsung, systemically
important financial institution, systemically important corporation 
Introduction
In order to effectively answer whether the Korean economy de-
pends too much on Samsung Electronics (Samsung),1 this paper 
first sets forth a new classification and characterizes Samsung as 
a “systemically important corporation (SICO).” SICO requires ob-
jective and unbiased criteria and should be distinguished from 
the rather subjective, biased, and even misleading term of “too 
much.” The “systemically important” concept was coined by the 
Financial Stability Board (FSB) after the subprime crisis to regu-
late globally influential financial institutions.2 FSB classifies a fi-
nancial institution as a “systemically important financial institu-
tion (SIFI)” if it satisfies one or more of the following conditions: 
size, interconnectedness, complexity in business model, global 
activity, and substitutability. Applying these conditions to Sam-
sung can provide new insight on how to identify and characterize 
the company. As a result, this paper demonstrates that Samsung 
is a SICO, and is therefore both a main driver of economic growth 
(upside) and a source of systemic risk (downside). Therefore, this 
paper argues that Samsung as a SICO should be viewed, treated 
and regulated accordingly. This paper focuses on two issues: 
(1) anti-monopoly and fair trade, and (2) separation of financial 
business from manufacturing business.
In addition, Samsung’s success has primarily derived from the 
nature of the semiconductor industry and technology—namely 
continuous but gradual change. This paper underscores that the 
nature of technology fits well with Korean people, education, 
culture and corporate structure. Therefore, in order to boost its 
economy, Korea needs to search other sectors which have the 
pattern of technology resembling the semiconductor industry.
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Samsung as a Systemically Important Corporation 
(SICO) in Korea
This paper characterizes Samsung as a “systemically important 
corporation (SICO),” a concept defined by reference to “systemi-
cally important financial institutions (SIFI).”3 SIFI was originally 
coined by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) to regulate bulge-
bracket financial institutions (especially banks) after the subprime 
crisis. The FSB concluded that the huge and complex financial in-
stitutions were responsible for the crisis. Their problems are not 
limited to themselves but can spread into the financial system and 
even into the economic system as a whole. In other words, they 
incur systemic risk. Therefore, FSB designates those financial insti-
tutions as SIFIs and imposes stricter regulations on them.
The regulation for SIFI starts with banks because their activities 
are closely related to systemic risk. However, FSB and regulators 
have continued to extend the scope of SIFI regulation to include 
nonbank financial companies such as insurance companies, se-
curities broker dealers, and financial market infrastructure insti-
tutions. The argument for extending the coverage of SIFI regu-
lation is that systemic risk stems not only from banks but from 
other financial institutions.
The same logic can be applied to nonfinancial companies. Sys-
temic risk is not only limited to the financial institutions, but can 
be brought about by nonfinancial companies (e.g. Nokia, Dae-
woo). Therefore, we can naturally extend the “systemically im-
portant” concept to nonfinancial manufacturing companies. This 
is the reason why we need to define and identify a “systemically 
important corporation (SICO).”
If a company—financial or nonfinancial—is systemically impor-
tant, the government is likely to inject tax payer money to bail it 
out if faced with financial distress. Because of the likelihood of 
government aid, the government can be justified to increase its 
ex-ante regulation for SIFI or SICO. When it comes to incurring 
systemic risk, a systemically important nonfinancial company is 
not that different from a financial company. Thus, to determine 
whether a nonfinancial company is systemically important, one 
can apply the same criteria4 used for financial institutions. This 
paper focuses on size, interconnectedness, and complexity of 
business model.
Size
Size is the most important indicator for determining SICO. Among 
many measures for size, market capitalization is the most widely 
used and accepted. Samsung Electronics (Samsung) accounts for 
18 percent of the total market capitalization of the Korea Exchange 
(KRX).5 Samsung conglomerate as a whole takes up 28 percent. 
The comparison of this number with those of the other global top 
20 Exchanges shows that the proportion is exceptionally high. For 
example, the biggest company in the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE), ExxonMobil, accounts for 3 percent of the total market 
capitalization. Apple is the largest company in NASDAQ, with 10 
percent of total market capitalization. Toyota, the largest company 
in the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE), takes up 5 percent. Petrochina 
also accounts for 5 percent of total market capitalization for the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange. The proportion of Bayer in Germany 
and Sanofi in France is 7 percent and 6 percent, respectively.6 In 
terms of relative proportion of market capitalization, Samsung in 
KRX is conspicuous compared with the other largest market capi-
talization companies in the top 20 Exchanges (see Figure 1).
Therefore, we can naturally extend the 
“systemically important” concept to 
nonfinancial manufacturing companies. 
This is the reason why we need to define 





























Figure 1: Comparison of the Largest Market Cap Companies in 
Major Exchanges
DB: Deutsch Borse, CAC: French Exchange, BSE: Bombay Stock Exchange, 
SSE: Shanghai Stock Exchange
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From the perspective of a percentage of market capitalization, 
Nokia of Finland stands out. The Helsinki Exchange, where Nokia 
has been listed, is not one of the top 20 Exchanges. However, 
Nokia shows how a failed SICO can be a detriment to the na-
tional economy, and provides a useful policy case for Korea. At its 
height in 2002, Nokia accounted for 74 percent of the total mar-
ket capitalization of the Finnish Helsinki Exchange, and was defi-
nitely considered a SICO in the Finnish economy. The number, 
however, plummeted to 7 percent in 2013. It has now bounced 
back to around 10 percent. Nokia is famous for “successful fail-
ure.” Even though Nokia’s technologies and human capital have 
been transferred to other start-up companies such as Rovio and 
Supercell, the Finnish economy has been stagnating.7 The Finnish 
economy has exhibited a negative growth rate for the past four 
years and is expected to decline again this year. The Nokia case 
underscores the significant role of SICO in terms of economic 
growth and systemic risk. Start-ups and SMEs can complement or 
partly replace SICO (e.g. Nokia, Samsung), but they cannot fully 
replace it. That is the reason why SICO is not easily substitutable.
In an export-driven economy like Korea, the size of export is a 
useful indicator of determining whether a company is SICO. In 
terms of a proportion of total export, Samsung is a SICO. Sam-
sung Electronics is responsible for 26 percent of Korea’s total 
exports; Samsung group as a whole amounts to 36 percent.8 Ko-
rea’s GDP is comprised of consumption (54 percent), investment 
(26 percent), government expenditure (16 percent), export (58 
percent) and import (54 percent). While the net export is only 4 
percent, total exports (58 percent) account for the bigger portion 
of GDP than consumption (54 percent).9 The global ranking also 
exhibits the Korean economy’s heavy reliance on exports. While 
Korea’s GDP is 14th in the world, the volume of trade ranks 7th. 
Consequently, Samsung is a SICO because it takes up the sub-
stantial portion of the exports, which is a systemically important 
macroeconomic variable in Korea.
Although it is not included in SIFI criteria defined by FSB, employ-
ment-generating capacity should be considered as a vital mea-
sure in classifying a company as a SICO. If company failure leads 
to significant job loss, the government has sufficient incentive to 
step in and bail it out. Samsung employs a significant number of 
workers in the domestic market. However, there is a huge gap 
between Samsung’s revenue-generating performance and em-
ployment-generating performance in the domestic market. As of 
2014, Samsung employed 310,000 people: 210,000 overseas and 
100,000 in the domestic market. In the 50,000 positions created 
in 2014, the domestic market accounts for only 10 percent. Sam-
sung is not as much “systemically important” in creating employ-
ment as in generating market values, sales and exporting goods. 
In terms of employment, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises 
(SMEs) play a dominant role.10
Interconnectedness
Interconnectedness is another criterion for determining SICO. 
This paper reviews the interconnectedness of Samsung in three 
different dimensions: technology characteristics, trickle-down ef-
fect, and supply chain. First, the semiconductor technology, Sam-
sung’s main technology, is a General Purpose Technology (GPT) 
and, by definition, is interconnected to a wide variety of indus-
tries. GPT exercises widespread influences on the other indus-
tries.11 According to the U.S. National Research Council, semicon-
ductor technology is a basic enabling technology for virtually any 
device that moves on or that shares, accumulates, transmits and 
manipulates information. As a result, it relates to every industry 
requiring memory or calculation capacity: ICT, automotive, aero-
space, shipbuilding, etc. Second, through the trickle-down effect, 
Samsung is closely related to domestic SMEs and subcontractors. 
Samsung is responsible for a dominant proportion of sales by 
domestic subcontractors. As a result, Samsung’s performance is 
directly associated with that of the related subcontractor compa-
nies. This is a channel through which Samsung has contributed 
to the domestic economy. Third, in terms of the supply chain, 
Samsung has business relationships with more than 400 custom-
er companies including Walmart, Best Buy, HP, and Apple and 
related to over 1,200 suppliers including Qualcomm, SAP, AUO, 
and Nikon etc. In terms of supply chain, Samsung is more heav-
ily interconnected to the overseas market than to the domestic 
one.12 Samsung earns 85 percent of operating income from the 
overseas market. It has more than 300 overseas subsidiaries and 
corporations. Foreign stockholders account for 70 percent of the 
ownership. Therefore, from the interconnectedness perspective, 
Samsung can be considered a SICO through the mechanism of 
General Purpose Technology (GPT) and trickle-down effect.
Complexity of Business Model
Samsung is classified as a SICO when measured by “the com-
plexity of business model,” the third standard for SICO. Samsung 
has a complicated and unique business model: it runs both “set 
business” and “component business.” This contrasts sharply 
with other major electronic companies who focus on only one 
of these businesses. For example, Apple produces only set prod-
ucts such as smartphones, tablets, and PCs. Intel specializes in 
Does the Korean Economy Depend Too Much on Samsung?
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component businesses including CPU, AP, and NAND. Table 1 
compares Samsung’s business model to those of other major 
electronic companies. In addition, Samsung is unique because 
it even competes with its client: Apple. While Apple is a client 
for Samsung’s component division, it is Samsung’s biggest com-
petitor in the set division. This uniqueness takes place because 
Samsung has a wide variety of product lines. From Samsung’s 
perspective, the diversified products may contribute to reduc-
ing business risk. However, because investors can diversify away 
risks by constructing portfolio companies, the complex business 
does not add value to investors but incurs “conglomerate dis-
count.” The “conglomerate discount” means the value of a con-
glomerate company is smaller than the summation of the value 
of each affiliate or division.13 Because of the opaqueness of the 
economy, the complicated business model has more chance to 
bring about systemic risk. That is the reason why “the complexity 
of business model” is included as a criterion for SIFI or SICO.
Through “circular shareholdings,”14 Samsung is even intercon-
nected with financial businesses including insurance, securities, 
credit card, and asset management business. Even though Sam-
sung Electronics does not operate a financial business, it is vul-
nerable to the risk caused by its financial affiliates because of this 
indirect connection. The complexity of this business model com-
bined with complicated governance structure exposes Samsung 
to uncertainty and makes it a SICO.
The Resonance of Semiconductor Industry with Samsung
The properties of the semiconductor industry and key  
success factors
Semiconductor manufacturing, Samsung’s primary business, is 
the biggest contributing factor for Samsung’s success and there-
by qualifies Samsung as a SICO. This paper identifies the proper-
ties of the semiconductor industry and the key success factors 
that are derived from the semiconductor industry. In addition, 
understanding the sources of Samsung’s success can further lead 
to the identification of other industries that can generate suc-
cessful and systemically important companies.
The first contributing characteristic of the semiconductor busi-
ness lies in its nature of technology. Semiconductor technology 
changes constantly but without the unexpected jump in techno-
logical innovation. This characteristic makes the technology rea-
sonably predictable.15
Table 1. Comparison of Business Scope: Samsung vs Competitors
Samsung Apple Intel Hynix LG Toshiba Sony
Component DRAM O O
NAND O � O O
AP O O O
CPU � O �
LCD O O
Image Sensor O � O
Set TV O O O O
Smartphone O O O O
Tablet O O � O
PC � O � � �
Camera O O
Game mach O
Home appliance O O �
Medical device � �
O: strong engagement 
�: medium engagement
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Second, the semiconductor business is also characterized by 
its innovation pattern: successive replacement of an outdated 
technology with a similar, but slightly enhanced technology. As a 
result of the slight enhancement of the technology in each suc-
cession, each generation cannot reach full market dominance 
(e.g. 100 percent market share) before it is replaced by the next 
generation (see Figure 2). The maximum market share for one 
version is usually limited to around 70 percent because several 
overlapping generations exist together in the same market at the 
same time. In addition to the overlapping lifecycle of several gen-
erations, each semiconductor product is short-lived.16 This figure 
also illustrates that the specific semiconductor DRAM’s market 
share changes from 10 percent to 90 percent in only about 4-5 
years. Figure 3 shows a changing pattern of an accumulated mar-
ket share. The evolution of semiconductor DRAM measured by 
memory capacity is represented by a concatenation of logistic 
functions. For example, the estimated function for 512M DRAM’s 
accumulated market share that fits well with data is a logistic 
function: f(t) = 250/(1 + 276.78e-1.2t).
Third, innovations in the semiconductor industry are frequently 
made in the manufacturing process, as compared to other in-
dustries where it originates in R&D (e.g., pharmaceutical indus-
try). The semiconductor industry is also characterized by the fact 
that innovation and productivity go hand in hand. In contrast, 
in the pharmaceutical industry, the increase in productivity is 
not translated directly into innovation. As a result, innovation in 
the pharmaceutical industry is harder to achieve and the indus-
try builds up an invincible entry barrier. Tables 2 and 3 show the 
resultant difference in incumbency of the two industries. While 
most incumbent companies in the pharmaceutical industry have 
remained in the global top 10 over time, those in the semicon-
ductor industry have failed to do so.
Taking all these characteristics into account, the first key success 
factor for the constantly changing semiconductor technology is 
“speed.” The constant, but gradually changing technology requires 
speedy investment and production for the next generation prod-
uct in response to the technological change. Second, due to the 
simple and clear direction for innovation (e.g., expanding memory 
capacity combined with reducing size), management must move 
in perfect order to achieve a clearly defined business goal. Third, 
the company developing a semiconductor needs to have suffi-
cient capital investment capability to invest in production facili-
ties. Thus, to be successful, such a company should expedite the 
production process to cut down the depreciation costs. The faster 
semiconductors get produced, the cheaper the price. The break-
down of operating costs of semiconductors shows that deprecia-














Figure 2: Market Share of Semi-conductor DRAM 








Figure 3: Accumulated Market Share of Semi-conductor DRAM 
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Table 2. Change in Global Rankings: Pharmaceutical Industry
1990 2000 2014
1. Merck 1. Pfizer 1. Pfizer
2. BMS 2. GSK 2. Novartis
3. Glaxo 3. Merck 3. Sanofi
4. Smithkline Beecham 4. Astrazeneca 4. Roche
5. Ciba Geigey 5. BMS 5. Merck
6. AHP 6. Novartis 6. GSK
7. J&J 7. J&J 7. Amgen
8. Eli Lilly 8. Aventis 8. Astrazeneca
9. Bayer 9. Eli Lilly 9. Eli Lilly
10. Roche 10. Roche 10. BMS
Red: companies which have stayed in the global top 10 league table over time
Table 3. Change in Global Rankings: Semiconductor Industry
1990 2000 2014
1. NEC 1. Intel 1. Intel
2. Texas Instruments 2. Toshiba 2. Samsung
3. Motorola 3. Texas Instruments 3. Qualcomm
4. Hitachi 4. Samsung 4. Micron
5. Toshiba 5. NEC 5. SK Hynix
6. Fujitsu 6. STMicro 6. Texas Instruments
7. Philips 7. Motorola 7. Toshiba
8. Intel 8. Infineon 8. Broadcom
9. National 9. Philips Semicon 9. STMicro
10. Matsushita 10. Micron 10. Renesas
Red: companies which have stayed in the global top 10 league table over time
costs contrasts to that of other industries: ICT (8 percent), petro-
chemical (5 percent), automotive (3 percent), and electric appli-
ances (3 percent). Thus, “speedy” production has a competitive 
edge in the semiconductor industry.
The reasons for the resonance of semiconductor industry  
with Korea
The semiconductor industry fits especially well with Korea,17 and 
is another important reason why Samsung has been so successful. 
This success is owed in part to Korea’s unique education, military, 
and corporate culture.
Korea is well known for its heavy focus on education. Korea’s 
educational system comprises long (even extreme) hours of 
homework, tests, and discipline. Private lessons after school are 
normal and popular. Students aged 14 to 24 years old devote 50 
hours per week to studying, the longest among OECD (Organ-
isation for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries 
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and substantially above the OECD average of 34. Per day study 
hours for Korean students is also the longest, followed by Finland 
and Japan.18 The extreme focus on education trains the Korean 
students to work under pressure and to be accustomed to the 
similarly repeated pattern of work, which is a characteristic of 
the semiconductor industry. The target of high school education 
is simple and clear: getting into college. This is the reason why 
the proportion of high school graduates who get into college is 
around 80 percent, the highest rate in the world. The simple and 
clear business target is another characteristic of the semiconduc-
tor industry.
Korean military service is another big contributor. The obligatory 
military service allows most of the Korean male population to be 
exposed to simple, repeated tasks: in military training, the sol-
diers move in perfect order and are under strict discipline with 
repeated training. The moving in perfect order and upgrading 
similar technology patterns are also success factors of the semi-
conductor industry.
The educational and military experiences for Koreans translate 
similarly into their work culture. Korean corporate culture is 
characterized by pursuit of a single objective, being disciplined, 
working well in a hierarchical corporate structure, and making 
quick decisions and implementation. In addition, long working 
hours are associated with another success factor of the semicon-
ductor industry: continuous operation of business for expedited 
production.19 This cultural rhythm of repetition throughout the 
life time of the Korean people happens to coincide well with that 
of the semiconductor industry.
All these experiences are translated into Samsung’s performance 
in the semiconductor industry. Indeed, Samsung’s corporate cul-
ture is disciplined, well-managed, strict, decisive and moving in 
perfect order. Samsung focuses on the management and opera-
tion system, allowing the company to speed up investment and 
production. In a nutshell, the natural frequency of Samsung is 
almost identical to that of the semiconductor industry, and why 
it resonates with it so well in Korea.
Samsung vs Apple: An Analogy with Futurism vs Cubism
As a metaphor, the constantly but gradually changing technol-
ogy of semiconductor industry is akin to the artistic pattern of 
Futurism in fine art. The arts in Futurism represent continuously 
but incrementally moving motions with a fixed single perspective 
(Figure 4). We can compare Samsung and Apple by analogy with 
two different “-isms” in fine arts: Futurism and Cubism. In contrast 
to Futurism, Cubism first decomposes an object and then recon-
structs it with multiple perspectives (Figure 5). While the creativ-
ity of Futurism lies in a gradually moving multiple timeframe, the 
originality of Cubism comes from multiple perspectives with a 
single timeframe. Samsung fixes on a single goal, such as increas-
ing memory capacity, and achieves it through an incrementally 
improving technology. Apple, just like Cubistic art, destructs the 
old products and reconstructs them with multiple perspectives. 
For example, the smartphone creatively reconstructs the com-
puter, phone and Internet.
Does the Korean Economy Depend Too Much on Samsung?
Figure 4. Nude Descending a Staircase (Duchamp)
Figure 5. Crying Woman (Picasso)  
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Industries Resembling the Semiconductor Industry20
Based on the analysis of the properties of the semiconductor in-
dustry and the key success factors in Samsung, to overcome its 
sluggish economy, this paper suggests that Korea should search 
for industries similar to the semiconductor industry. This paper 
identifies the biosimilar industry and the rechargeable battery 
industry as promising candidates for technologies, and the pri-
vate equity fund (PEF) industry as a promising candidate for the 
financial sector.
A biosimilar drug is a biologic medical product that is similar to 
an original drug product,21 but can be approved without the full 
clinical trial after certain patents covering the original drug ex-
pire. While biosimilar companies try to make their product as 
close as possible to the original, they do not have access to the 
originator’s manufacturing process. The manufacturing or pro-
duction process can be critically important for biosimilars be-
cause unlike the more common small-molecule drugs, biologics 
generally exhibit high molecular complexity, and may be quite 
sensitive to changes in the manufacturing processes.
Certain characteristics of the biosimilar industry are comparable 
to those of the semiconductor industry. As mentioned, much like 
the semiconductor industry, the manufacturing process of the 
biosimilar company is one of the most important processes in 
developing a biosimilar product. This is because the drug struc-
ture, its efficacy, and toxicity are already known and the tech-
nological challenge remains in the manufacturing of the specific 
drug as similar to the original biologics as possible. Analogous 
to the semiconductor industry, a biosimilar company requires 
several essential infrastructures such as commercial-scale pro-
duction facilities and sterile rooms. In addition, the production 
target is clear in a biosimilar company in the sense that it aims 
at copying a specific original biologic product. The uncertainty a 
biosimilar company faces is therefore significantly reduced be-
cause it copies an already proven product.
Another industry resembling the semiconductor industry is the 
rechargeable battery industry. Maximizing recharge capacity, in-
stead of memory capacity, is a simple goal. Rechargeable bat-
teries resemble semiconductors in many respects: a single and 
clear goal, the nature of technology, and the pattern and source 
of innovation. However, the innovation cycle of the rechargeable 
battery is longer than that of semiconductors, which is where the 
industries differ.
In the financial industry, private equity funds (PEF) resemble the 
semiconductor industry. First, the similar corporate restructur-
ing pattern repeats itself. A typical restructuring process of PEFs 
begins with buyout or at least acquiring significant portion of 
target shares. If a PEF comes to control the target company, the 
next thing is to change the incumbent management and create 
a new board representation. By designing an appropriate com-
pensation scheme for a new management, PEFs focus only on 
financing and big restructuring issues. New management takes 
care of the general business operation. If restructuring is almost 
done and an exit is expected, a PEF returns to the first stage of 
the business cycle and searches for another target company. 
The new target company search process is akin to new product 
development in the semiconductor industry. For example, if the 
lifecycle of a 1G semiconductor DRAM reaches a matured stage, 
a newly-developed 2G DRAM gets introduced to the market. 
Second, compared with venture capital, PEFs are exposed to less 
uncertainty. Unlike venture capital’s target firms—which, by defi-
nition, have new business models—PEFs target distressed firms 
with established track records. A new PEF target firm is predict-
able and not exposed to high uncertainty. Third, as in the semi-
conductor business, rapid and perfectly in order restructuring is 
crucial in PEF business because the value of distressed firms de-
cays exponentially. As in the semiconductor industry, “speed” is a 
vital consideration and a key success factor for the PEF industry.
Proposed Regulation of a SICO
Being classified as “systemically important” is both positive 
and negative. The positive aspect is that a SICO makes a pivotal 
contribution to economic growth; the negative aspect is that 
a SICO may become a source of systemic risk. There are two 
channels that Samsung may bring about systemic risk. First, be-
cause of Samsung’s dominant position in the market, Samsung 
may cause a systemic risk by preventing innovative start-ups or 
SMEs from maturing. Samsung may also incur a systemic risk 
through the simultaneous operation of manufacturing and fi-
nancial businesses.
To avoid the systemic risk of dwarfing growth of innovative start-
ups or SMEs, the Korean government should focus on anti-mo-
nopoly and fair trade policies. A lesson can be learned from U.S. 
history: controlling the dominant power of IBM in the 1980s-
1990s led to a growth of Microsoft, which was a start-up compa-
ny during the period. Similarly, without the U.S. anti-monopoly 
laws in the 2000s, the world would not have seen the splendid 
growth of Apple, Google and Amazon because of the Microsoft 
monopoly. Similarly, the Korean government needs to regulate 
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Samsung such that it does not exercise excessive power in the 
market. The regulation will allow the birth and/or growth of oth-
er globally competitive companies like Samsung.
Second, to avert a systemic risk, the Samsung conglomerate 
needs to separate its financial business from the manufacturing 
(e.g. semiconductor) business. It is an effective way not only to 
minimize a systemic risk of Korean economy, but also to preserve 
a systemically important corporation, i.e., Samsung Electronics. 
While Samsung Electronics itself does not run a financial busi-
ness, it is connected to financial businesses through the circular 
holdings of the Samsung conglomerate, which operates finan-
cial businesses such as insurance, securities, and credit cards 
through affiliates.
General Electric (GE) recognized this problem and the neces-
sity for separating the manufacturing division from its financial 
component. GE was first designated as SIFI in 2013 by the U.S. 
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) because of GE capi-
tal.22 GE reshaped itself by spinning off its financial arms so that 
GE can focus on manufacturing. In June 2015, GE announced that 
it would sell its financial assets to Wells Fargo and Blackstone to 
avoid additional stronger regulations.23 A similar path should be 
followed by Samsung to prevent systemic risk.
Regulation is not everything. There is an important issue that 
should be addressed by Samsung itself. While Samsung has sub-
stantially contributed to the Korean economy, it faces a new chal-
lenge: domestic employment. Unlike in the past, the most widely 
accepted and important economic contribution at the moment is 
generating employment. Samsung should address a gap between 
its economic power as a SICO and its employment generating per-
formance in the domestic market. Samsung obtains less than 30 
percent of its total employment from the Korean market. While 
Samsung has been expanding production in foreign countries and 
earning most of its operating income from the overseas markets, 
the percentage of the domestic employment has been decreas-
ing. Thus, the increase in export does not translate into domestic 
production, demand and economic growth. Accordingly, this leads 
to an argument that Samsung no longer makes as big of a contri-
bution to Korea, even though Samsung accounts for a significant 
proportion of market capitalization, sales and exports.
Conclusion
Applying SIFI conditions, this paper shows that Samsung is a “sys-
temically important corporation (SICO)” in terms of size, inter-
connectedness, and business complexity. If Samsung qualifies as 
a SICO, to reduce the systemic risk of Korean economy, Samsung 
should be viewed, treated, and regulated accordingly. Two policy 
issues are emphasized: (1) anti-monopoly and fair trade, (2) sep-
aration of financial business from manufacturing business.
This paper also shows that Samsung’s success is closely associ-
ated with the nature of semiconductor technology: constant but 
gradual changes. In other words, in the semiconductor industry, 
a similar innovative pattern repeats itself without the unexpect-
ed jump. Because of the resonance of this technology with the 
Korean people, culture, and corporate structure, this paper sug-
gests that Korea should search for the industries similar to the 
semiconductor industry as sectors for future growth.
Samsung should address a gap between 
its economic power as a SICO and its 





1 In this paper, Samsung means Samsung Electronics. When this paper refers to Samsung group as a whole, it uses the word, Samsung Conglomerate.
2 The Financial Stability Board (FSB) is a forum consisting of G20 country’s ministers of finance and central bank governors. The FSB has assumed a key role in promoting 
the reform of international finance regulation.
3 Besides SIFI or SICO, we can define “systemically important asset” if the asset has systemic influence to an economy. For example, real estate is a systemically important 
asset in Korea.
4 There is a measure like “employment” which is considered better suited to manufacturing companies than to financial companies. However, SIFI conditions alone can 
give us a new insight in characterizing SICO like Samsung.
5 All of market cap percentages in this section are average percentages calculated from the two years daily stock price data from July 2013 to June 2015.
6 One exceptional case is Teva Pharmaceutical Industries (“Teva”), the biggest company in Israel. Teva’s market capitalization amounts to 30 percent. But the Tel Aviv Stock 
Exchange is not one of the top 20 Exchanges.
7 Historically, Nokia has succeeded in transforming itself to an entirely different entity. At first, it changed from a timber company to an Information and Communications 
Technology (ICT) company. Now, after selling its major businesses, Nokia transformed into a non-performing entity (NPE), widely known as a “patent troll.” Nokia has 
more than 30,000 patent rights.
8 The number is a 5-year average from 2010 to 2014.
9 The number is a 5-year average from 2010 to 2014.
10 In Korea, SMEs account for 90 percent of total employment. Large corporations including Samsung account for only 10 percent. This phenomenon is not limited to Korea.
11 The distinguishing features of General Purpose Technology (GPT) include pervasiveness, improvement and innovation spawning. Pervasiveness, the defining property of 
GPT, means it has an impact on technical change and productivity of a large number of industries. In addition, GPT should experience continuous improvement in its own 
industry and induce innovation in other sectors.
12 “Global activity” is another but secondary important criterion for SIFI. Because we focus on Samsung’s SICO position in the domestic market, we do not review it more in 
detail.
13 We can witness the conglomerate discount not just in manufacturing companies but in financial conglomerates like financial holding companies. This is frequently 
verified in empirical studies.
14 Circular shareholding refers to cross shareholding by three or more companies. In other words, Company A invests in Company B, which invests in C Company, and then C 
Company invests in Company A, which results in a circular shape of investment.
15 Clayton Christensen defines such technology as an “enhancing” technology in The Innovator’s Dilemma (1997).
16 By analogy with biology, semiconductor DRAM is regarded as a “Drosophila Melanogaster (fruit fly)” in technology evolution.
17 “Resonance” is a phenomenon in physics which takes places when a wave meets another wave with identical natural frequency and, as a result, brings about greater 
amplitude.
18 OECD Report (2013).
19 The per year working hour of Korean labor is about 2,200 hours, second only to Mexico among OECD countries. OECD average is 1,700 hours.
20 “Resembling” here means that the estimated function for an industry’s property (e.g. accumulated market share) has similar shape as in the semiconductor industry (e.g. 
logistic function). But, due to data availability, this paper cannot estimate and identify the functions. Because the rechargeable industry has a short history and private 
equity firms are, by definition, private firms, it is difficult to get data. The rigorous estimation will be a future research agenda.
21 Blanchard, A., H. D’Iorio and R. Ford, “What You Need to Know to Succeed: Key Trends in Canada’s Biotech Industry,” Insights (Spring 2010).
22 FSOC was established based on the “Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.” It has the right to designate SIFI in the United States.
23 Additional regulation includes larger capital, higher liquidity, lower leverage, etc.
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